




DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS 





ON CORRUPTION AND INSTITUTIONS 




















Working Paper No. 06/12 
September 2006 
 
 On Corruption and Institutions
in Decentralized Economies
Svetlana Andrianova1
Economics Department, University of Leicester
Leicester LE1 7RH, UK.
E-mail: s.andrianova@le.ac.uk.
Abstract. This paper presents a model of opportunistic behaviour in
decentralized economic exchange and considers the impact of inadequate
institutional framework of formal contract enforcement on economic per-
formance. It is shown that (i) when the number of cheating traders is
suﬃciently large, inadequate institutions result in a loss of decentralized
trading contracts, (ii) an adequate institutional framework, while being
necessary for the attainment of a Pareto optimal outcome, may not be
suﬃcient if traders perceive it as inadequate; and (iii) suﬃciently good
formal enforcement provisions help deter contractual breach in enviro-
ments with corrupt and powerful enforcers.
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JEL C70, D82, K421 Introduction
This paper puts forward a simple framework for analyzing the impact of institutions
on the implementation of reforms in CEE.2 The institution under study is formal
contract enforcement which is widely regarded as an important ingredient of well-
functioning markets. In the model I construct, an economic exchange is subject
to opportunistic behaviour and may be undertaken in one of two sectors, labelled
‘state’ and ‘market’. The two sectors diﬀer in their trading potential as well as the
eﬀectiveness of contract enforcement. Trade in the state sector is less eﬃcient than
in the market (when measured in terms of an achievable trade surplus), but the
state contract enforcement is more eﬀective in curtailing opportunistic behaviour.
In contrast, the market sector is able to deliver a higher trade surplus, but due to
less eﬀective deterrence of opportunistic behaviour, the higher trade surplus may
fail to materialize.
It is shown in this simple setting that inadequate or incomplete institutional
framework necessarily leads to a loss of decentralized trading contracts.3 Fur-
thermore, an adequate institutional framework (speciﬁcally, a contract enforcement
system which ensures a suﬃciently high probability of punishment for contractual
breach), although conducive to achieving a Pareto optimal outcome, may not be
suﬃcient: agents’ perceptions of the inadequacy of the legal system may force the
reforming economy into an inferior outcome even when the level of enforcement
provisions is relatively high. In the stylized setting of this paper, the perception of
the inadequacy of the legal system arises due to a negative enforcement externality:
the higher the proportion of non-complying agents the more diﬃcult it is to detect
non-compliance. In such a case, the perception of a legal void leads to the high-
est level of undeterred opportunistic behaviour in the economy which, if combined
with a large number of opportunists, forces honest agents to avoid the market alto-
gether. The higher the enforcement externality, the higher the level of enforcement
required to achieve a Pareto optimal outcome. For a suﬃciently high enforcement
externality, the perception of legal inadequacy is most damaging: even the most
extensive legal provisions will not suﬃce to achieve the good equilibrium, because
1the ﬁxed resources devoted to enforcement are spread too thinly for the number of
non-complying agents.
These predictions are in line with observed economic and institutional perfor-
mance in CEE over the last decade. Countries where a relatively good legal and
other institutional infrastructure is perceived by the economic actors as adequate
(e.g. the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Estonia) tend to have a high degree
of success with liberalization and reforms (EBRD 1999, IMF 2000). At the same
time, countries with a perception of legal inadequacy tend to have less stable eco-
nomic environment and an unsatisfactoryprogress with reforms. Russia provides the
most striking example: despite relatively high measures of economic liberalization,
the perceived inadequacy of extensive legal provisions—which in 1998 according to
the EBRD legal transition index measured 3.7 for extensiveness but only 2 for ef-
fectiveness, on the scale of 1 (worst) to 4 (best)—is an important factor behind the
negative growth rates and the epidemic of crime in the late 1990s (EBRD 1999,
pp. 260–1).4 The analysis therefore suggests that some of the government’s reform
eﬀort in transition should be directed towards both improving the adequacy as well
as the perception of adequacy of the legal system to support markets.5
Another set of predictions derived in this paper relates to corruptibility of en-
forcers. Observers of the transition experience agree that wide-spread, and in some
cases endemic, corruption played a critical role when reform eﬀorts in CEE were
deemed unsatisfactory.6 I therefore supplement the analysis of contract enforce-
ment in a decentralized setting with a study of corruption.7 The ﬁndings presented
here suggest that, other things equal, a Pareto optimal outcome is more diﬃcult to
achieve when enforcers are corruptible. In such a case, the strong enforcement of
contracts must be complemented with a high enough number of honest enforcers,
for the good equilibrium to exist. The analysis also uncovers the following surpris-
ing but intuitive result: when all enforcers are corrupt and enjoy strong bargaining
power, but the enforcement institution itself is relatively eﬀective in terms of a suf-
ﬁciently high probability of breach detection, the Pareto optimal outcome exists as
a unique equilibrium. In such a case, the opportunistic behaviour of suppliers is
2deterred because it is cheaper to honour the contract than engage in a bribing game
with a corrupt enforcer. The analysis therefore suggests that strong institutions
(e.g. adequate legal framework for a smooth functioning of markets) have an even
greater importance in the economy with a high corruption level.8
The model presented here helps explain markedly diﬀerent reform performance
of apparently quite similar CEE countries. It contributes to the growing literature
which stresses the importance of (law enforcement) institutions in transition: e.g.
Bergl¨ of and Bolton (2002b), Hoﬀ and Stiglitz (2004), Roland and Verdier (2003)
and Sonin (2003), among others. In these models, a combination of a law enforce-
ment externality (the relative attractiveness of law abiding behaviour, given the
behaviour of other agents in the economy) and other economic factors (listed be-
low) leads to multiple equilibria, thus making it possible for a good outcome with
strong incentives for an individual to support the rule of law and undertake pro-
ductive activities at an eﬃcient level (e.g. build value of an asset rather than strip
it, engage in production rather than rob others, undertake a productive investment
project rather than engage in rent-seeking, etc.) to coexist in the same parameter
space with an outcome in which these incentives, and consequently the economy’s
performance, are poor. These other factors, which complement the enforcement
externality, include the ‘tax compliance externality’ or government (in)ability to
raise revenues for ﬁnancing the establishment of a new market-friendly legal system
(Roland and Verdier 2003), a ‘voting externality’ whereby an individual voting deci-
sion and positioning in a political spectrum is aﬀected by other agents’ actions and
voting decisions (Hoﬀ and Stiglitz 2004, Bergl¨ of and Bolton 2002b), the extent of
income inequality and wealth bias among voters (Bergl¨ of and Bolton 2002b, Sonin
2003), the incentives for rent-seeking (Sonin 2003), and the degree of equitability in
property rights allocation (Polishchuk 1999). In contrast with the models studied
in the above papers, the present work highlights the importance of market institu-
tions in transition by proposing a simple model based on bilateral contracting under
possibly imperfect contract enforcement.
Implications of corrupt behaviour of agents entrusted with providing formal con-
3tract enforcement are also analyzed by Mui (1999) in a model of incomplete con-
tracting with one-sided relationship-speciﬁc investment, pre- and post-trial renego-
tiation of the original contract, a corrupt proﬁt-maximizing judge and an uncor-
rupt supreme authority that monitors court rulings. Focusing explicitly on judicial
favouritism—the corrupt enforcer’s preference to accept bribes from a litigant who
is better-connected to the political elite (which translates into a reduced probability
of being caught accepting bribes)—Mui (1999) ﬁnds that judicial corruption in this
setting leads to ineﬃcient investment incentives regardless of the investing party’s
connections (although the eﬃciency loss is more severe if the investing party’s con-
nectedness is worse than that of her contractual partner). Essentially, the investing
party, who rationally expects to pay a signiﬁcant part of the trade surplus to the
corrupt judge in exchange for the enforcement of the original contract, will be pre-
pared to avoid the litigation by transferring this amount to the contractual partner
instead at the pre-trial renegotiation stage. In contrast, the complete contracting
model of economy-wide bilateral trade in the present paper is set up with a focus
on inadequacy of legal enforcement provisions for facilitating anonymous exchange.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The simple model is introduced
and analyzed in section 2. Two main extensions of the simple model, namely an
enforcement externality and corruptibility of enforcers, are considered in section
3. The importance of institutional quality in environments with high corruption is
further analyzed in section 4, where the assumptions of the basic set-up are relaxed
to allow costly litigation, punishment of corrupt enforcers and two-sided contractual
breach. Comparative statics results and their policy implications are discussed in
section 5. Concluding remarks are supplied in section 6.
2 A simple model
2.1 Assumptions and timing
There are two equally sized large populations of risk-neutral players: buyers and
sellers. In a one shot game, a buyer and a sellernegotiatea contract(z,p(z)) whereby
4the seller agrees to deliver one unit of a product embodying a speciﬁed value of a
quality parameter, z ≥ 0, and the buyer agrees to pay the price p(z) ≥ 0u pf r o n t . 9
The net value that the buyer obtains from the product is given by U = z − p(z).
Provision of quality costs c(z) ≥ 0 to the seller who gains V = p(z) − c(z)i ft h e
contract is agreed. Three levels of quality are considered: high (z =¯ z), mediocre
(z = z), and low (z = 0), with ¯ z>z> 0. The corresponding costs and prices are:
c(¯ z)=¯ c, c(z)=c, c(0) = 0, with ¯ c>c> 0; and p(¯ z)=¯ p, p(z)=p, p(0) = 0. Also,
¯ z>¯ c and z >c , so that signing a contract for quality z>0 is worthwhile ex ante.
Each player can only sign one contract. The outside options of buyers and sellers
are zero.
All buyers are homogeneous.10 The population of sellers contains two types:
opportunistic in proportion γ ∈ (0,1) and honest in proportion 1 − γ. The seller’s
type is his private information. An honest seller never fails to honour the contract
(say, due to a large ‘psychic’ cost of breaking promises), while an opportunist chooses
whether to abide by the contract depending on the extent of contract enforcement.
A contract is breached if the seller fails to deliver the contracted quality.
The economy is divided into two sectors: the market (or decentralized) sector of
size µ ∈ (0,1), and the state (or centralized) sector of size 1 − µ. The assignment
of a seller to a sector is random, while buyers can choose the sector in which to
trade. The two sectors (subscripted m and s) are distinguished by the following two
factors. Firstly, the levels of quality contractible in each sector are zm = {¯ z,0} and
zs = {z,0}. The assumption captures the idea that the sellers operating in the state
sector cannot beat the market sellers in the level of contractible product quality (for
z>0) due to, say additional costs of bureaucratic procedures on writing contracts in
the state sector (or other deﬁciencies imposed by centralizedinformationprocessing).
Furthermore, ¯ z − ¯ c>z− c, so that (ignoring the problem of enforcement) a total
trading surplus from a market contract is higher than that from a state contract.
The second factor which distinguishes the two sectors is the eﬀectiveness of
contract enforcement. Enforcement in the state sector is certain and facilitated by
speciﬁc performance: the breaching party is forced to do exactly as the contract
5speciﬁes. In contrast, enforcement in the market sector is uncertain and enacted
by means of reliance damages: with probability λ ∈ (0,1) the buyer receives from
the breaching seller a monetary payment, d>0, which makes the buyer as well
oﬀ as if there had been no contract. These assumptions are motivated as follows.
The sector with a high degree of centralization relies on commands in enforcement
of contracts, as well as in undertaking of economic activity (Kroll 1987, Pistor
1996). Certainty of enforcement in the state sector, as opposed to its uncertainty
in the market sector, reﬂects the observation that in a formerly planned economy
the state sector legal provisions are highly developed and well understood, while
those necessary for emerging markets are patchy, inadequate, and confusing (Gray
1993, Pistor 1996, Rubin 1997, EBRD 1999).11 Additionally, it is assumed that (i)
dispute resolution is instantaneous, (ii) enforcement is invoked immediately after
the contractual breach, and (iii) litigation costs are zero.12
The timing of the game is as follows.
(1) Nature determines the type of every seller and assigns every seller to a sector.
(2) Each buyer chooses the sector in which to purchase the product.
(3) A buyer and a seller negotiate a contract. If they fail to agree, then each gets
his/her outside option of 0. If the contract (˜ z,p(˜ z)) is agreed, the buyer pays
p(˜ z).
(4) The seller delivers the product of quality z.
(5) If a contract breach has occurred (i.e. if z  =˜ z), then the contract (˜ z,p(˜ z)) is
enforced as follows: speciﬁc performance is enacted with probability 1 in the
state sector, or a reliance damage measure is applied with probability λ in the
market sector.
(6) Payoﬀs are realized.
62.2 Analysis of the simple model
Given the sequential nature of the game, the appropriate solution method is back-
ward induction: having determined the best strategy for the quality choice by an
opportunistic seller in each sector at stage 4, I consider the buyers’ best strategy for
their choice of contract at stage 3 and their choice of sector at stage 2 given sellers’
choice at stage 4. The methodology for deriving all the results in the paper is stan-
dard, and the proofs of all propositions are therefore omitted. Costly provision of
quality implies that the equilibrium quality in this setting will be determined by the
proportion of opportunistic sellers and the extent of formal contract enforcement.
The analysis is restricted to pure strategies. Also, contractual prices are assumed
to be ﬁxed in a way that makes a buyer and a seller willing to sign the contract:
Assumption 1 c <p<z and ¯ c<¯ p<¯ z. (A1)
Note that buyers’ choice of sector in stage 2 would in general lead to an excess
demand for a given sector. Should this be the case, the buyer’s success (or failure)
in achieving her choice of sector will be determined randomly by Nature, since all
buyers are identical. Moreover, I shall assume that any excess demand for a given
sector is absorbed by the other sector: the buyer who is not successful in obtaining a
contract in her preferred sector has the opportunity to contract in the other sector.13
When provision of quality is costly, an opportunistic seller in either sector prefers
to supply a lower level of quality than contracted upon. Perfect contract enforcement
in the state sector, however, forces opportunistic sellers to abide by the contractual
terms and thus guarantees that the medium level of quality z contractible in the
state sector is delivered. Consequently, perfect enforcement implies that the buyer
in the state sector will optimally choose contract (z,p ). The payoﬀs to the buyer
and either type of seller are:
Us(z)=z − p and Vs(z)=p − c. (1)
Consider contracting under imperfect market contract enforcement. Denote by
q = {0,1} an opportunistic seller’s choice of breach (q = 0) or compliance with
7(q = 1) his contract (¯ z, ¯ p). Under the enforcement regime λ with the reliance
damage measure d =¯ p, the expected payoﬀs to the buyer and each type of seller,
superscripted by γ and 1− γ,a r e :
Um(¯ z,λ)=[ 1 − γ(1− q)]· ¯ z − [1 − λγ(1− q)]· ¯ p, (2)
V γ
m(¯ z,λ)=[ 1 − λ(1− q)]· ¯ p − q · ¯ c, (3)
V 1−γ
m (¯ z,λ)=¯ p − ¯ c, (4)
if contract (¯ z, ¯ p) is agreed, or 0 otherwise. In the above, q is set by the opportunistic
seller so that (3) is maximized. Given the sellers’ payoﬀ-maximizing value of q,t h e
buyer expects to obtain ¯ z in all cases except when she is matched with a breaching
opportunist (with probability γ(1− q)) and she expects to pay the price ¯ p up front
unless the breached contract is enforced (with probability λγ(1 − q)). An honest
seller complies with his contract (¯ z, ¯ p), and thus expects the payoﬀ given by (4). An
opportunistic seller expects to retain the up front payment ¯ p unless his breach is
enforced (with probability λ(1−q)), while he expects to incur the cost of supplying
high quality only if he complies (with probability q). In deciding whether to contract
or take her outside option when in the market sector, the buyer takes into account
the sellers’ optimal choice of q and chooses the larger of the two payoﬀs: Um(¯ z,λ | q)
or 0.
The buyer’s equilibrium choice of sector at stage 2 will depend on (a) the frac-
tion of buyers who choose the market sector, and (b) the size of her payoﬀ from the
market sector contract vis-` a-vis that from the state sector contract. Given that any
excess demand for one sector is absorbed by the other sector, the equilibrium allo-
cation of (identical) buyers across the two sectors—namely µ buyers in the market
sector and 1−µ buyers in the state sector—is, however, independent of an individual
buyer’s sector choice.14
Consider possible equilibria of the sequential game. Recall that opportunistic
sellers in the market may choose to breach (q = 0) or honour (q = 1) their contract
for quality ¯ z. Also, seller of either type prefers contracting to no contracting by
assumption. Buyers who end up in the state sector prefer contracting for z to
8their outside option since Us(z) > 0, given the perfect enforcement of state sector
contracts. Buyers who end up in the market sector prefer contracting for ¯ z to their
outside option if Um(¯ z,λ |q) ≥ 0, or take their outside option if Um(¯ z,λ |q) < 0.
We therefore have three candidates for equilibria in this game and these are listed
in Table 1.
Table 1: Description of equilibria.
Equilibrium Contracting in Economy trade surplus
which sector?
Strong
enforcement (SE) q = 1 state&market (1 − µ)(z − c)+µ(¯ z − ¯ c)
Intermediate
enforcement (IE) q = 0 state&market (1 − µ)(z − c)+µ(1 − γ)(¯ z − ¯ c)
Weak
enforcement (WE) q =0 s t a t eo n l y ( 1− µ)(z − c)
Which of these surpluses are attained in equilibrium is given by the following:
Proposition 1 Assume (A1) and let ˆ λ ≡ [¯ p−(1−γ)¯ z]/(γ¯ p). There exists a unique
equilibrium of the game and it is (i) SE if λ ≥ ¯ c/¯ p, (ii) IE if ˆ λ ≤ λ<¯ c/¯ p and
γ<(¯ z − ¯ p)/(¯ z − ¯ c), or (iii) WE if λ<min

ˆ λ;¯ c/¯ p

.
The intuition behind the proposition is straightforward. A suﬃciently high prob-
ability of formal contract enforcement (case 1i) forces opportunistic sellers to comply
with the terms of their contract thus making it attractive for the buyers in the mar-
ket to contract for quality ¯ z. For a given sector size, all beneﬁcial trades are realized
in the entire economy. In contrast, a low probability of enforcement (case 1iii) makes
the market contract inferior compared to the buyers’ outside option and beneﬁcial
trades in the market are lost. In the intermediate equilibrium (case 1ii), the proba-
bility of enforcement is high enough while the proportion of breaching sellers is small
enough, so that the combination of these two parameters makes the buyer’s expected
payoﬀ from the market contract for ¯ z larger than her outside option and thus in-
9duces those buyers who are in the market to contract even though enforcement is
not suﬃcient to deter breach by opportunistic market sellers.
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Fig.1(a) illustrates Prop.1 and suggests that SE equilibrium would disappear
if ¯ p is close to ¯ c. In other words, it is more diﬃcult to achieve compliance when
the bargaining power of the buyers is high. If this is so, then even a relatively high
probability of formal contract enforcement is not suﬃcient to deter breach of market
contracts by opportunistic sellers. Intuitively, when the buyers can extract most of
the trade surplus, opportunists do not have a large enough stake in the contract
(¯ z, ¯ p) and would prefer to breach it even when enforcement is highly likely.
It immediately follows from Prop.1 that liberalization of the economy (a rise in
µ) leads to a higher welfare when enforcement of market contracts is strong (1i)
and/or proportion of opportunists is low (1ii). Otherwise (1iii), an increase in the
size of the market leads to an inferior outcome for this economy, since a large number
of potentially beneﬁcial trades are lost.
The exogenously ﬁxed size of the market sector, µ, in the setting above appears
to be a reasonable assumption if the two sectors are interpreted literally: after all,
governments have the ultimate control over the size of the economy/sector that
could be privatized. It could be envisaged, however, that the two sectors capture
10diﬀerent types of contracting possible in the economy: two diﬀerent goods available
for trade, {z, ¯ z}, are associated with diﬀerent enforcement regimes: a standard
good, z, with a known certain enforcement and a tailor-made (and, perhaps, more
enjoyable/proﬁtable) good, ¯ z, with less certain enforcement (e.g. buying a house
from a developer or building a house according to own design). Then it is reasonable
to assume that the buyer and seller in a given trading pair would be able to choose
between z,¯ z, and 0 (non-contracting). Being oﬀered all three possibilities, and
taking into account the perfect enforcement associated with contract (z,p ), no buyer
would prefer to opt out of contracting if wide-spread breaching behaviour in (¯ z, ¯ p)i s
expected. Instead, the buyer would then choose to contract for z. Straightforwardly,
the equilibrium choice of the contract is (¯ z, ¯ p)i fλ ≥ ¯ c/¯ p, as before: in this range of
the institutionalquality, every opportunistic seller would comply with (¯ z, ¯ p), making
it attractive for every buyer to sign this contract. If breach of (¯ z, ¯ p) by opportunistic
sellers is expected (λ<¯ c/¯ p), then the buyer would still choose this contract over
(z,p ), provided that it leads to a higher expected payoﬀ: (1−γ)¯ z−(1−λγ)¯ p ≥ z−p,
or λ ≥ [z − p +¯ p − (1− γ)¯ z]/¯ p ≡ λ∗ (where λ∗ < 1i fγ<γ ∗ =[ ¯ z − ¯ p − (z − p)]/z).
Alternatively, if λ<λ ∗ and λ<¯ c/¯ p, then all opportunistic sellers breach the tailor-
made contract but the deﬁnite compliance with the standard contract ensures that
the latter is, nevertheless, signed. Thus, allowing the buyer-seller pair to choose
between ¯ z, z and 0, leads to qualitatively similar results to those stated above,
except that the worst possible scenario, formerly called WE equilibrium, will now
exhibit contracting for (z,p ).15
3E x t e n s i o n s
3.1 Enforcement externality
Suppose now that the resources devoted to enforcement are ﬁxed, and therefore the
likelihood of enforcement declines with the rise of the fraction of breached market
contracts. Formally, let λ(q)=λ(1 − δ(1 − q)), where λ is the exogenous level of
enforcement available in the economy, q is the probability with which opportunistic
11sellers comply with their market contract, and δ ∈ (0,1) is the enforcement exter-
nality parameter, introduced to capture ﬁxed resources available for enforcement.
For a given proportion of breaching opportunists, the larger the externality, δ,t h e
lower is the probability of enforcement, λ(q). By construction, enforcement is more
likely the fewer breached contracts there are: λ(0) = λ(1 − δ) <λ= λ(1).
As in section 2.2, the following cut-oﬀ value functions are derived for the exoge-





m(¯ z,λ)|q=1≥ V γ
m(¯ z,λ)|q=0,
if λ <λ δ
1 then V γ
m(¯ z,λ)|q=1<Vγ
m(¯ z,λ)|q=0,
if λ <λ δ







¯ p − (1− γ)¯ z
γ¯ p(1− δ)
(5)
Comparison of these three cut-oﬀs for λ suggests that, in contrast to the results in
section 2.2, the equilibrium may no longer be unique.
Proposition 2 Assume (A1). Then for any δ ∈ (0,1) there exists an equilibrium
of the game.
2.1 The equilibrium is unique and it is (i) SE if λ ≥ λδ
1 and δ<1 − ¯ c/¯ p, (ii) IE
if λδ
2 ≤ λ < ¯ c/¯ p, or (iii) WE if λ < min{¯ c/¯ p,λδ
2}.
2.2 Otherwise, if ¯ c/¯ p ≤ λ <λ δ
1 the equilibrium is not unique:
(i) if max {¯ c/¯ p;λδ
2}≤λ < min {λδ
1,1} then SE and IE coexist;
(ii) or if ¯ c/¯ p ≤ λ < min {λδ
1,λ δ
2,1} then SE and WE coexist.
Fig.1(b) illustrates the proposition for the case when δ<1 − ¯ c/¯ p and therefore
λδ
1 < 1. The intuition behind the existence of multiple equilibria is linked to the
negative enforcement externality which makes equilibrium determination dependent
upon each seller’s belief about other sellers’ behaviour. If a given seller believes that
all other sellers are breaching their market contract, then the cost of his individual
compliance is larger than the beneﬁt from his individual breach which is detected
12with a low probability: ﬁxed resources devoted to enforcement are spread too thinly
over the large number of breaches. Similarly, a seller’s belief of other sellers’ compli-
ance makes individual breach too costly due to high detection probability. Fig.1(b)
also highlights the signiﬁcance of the enforcement externality: if it is suﬃciently
high (δ ≥ 1 − ¯ c/¯ p), then λδ
1(γ) shifts out to the level of 1 or beyond, and mul-
tiple equilibria exist for any reasonably high value of the exogenous enforcement
level, λ ≥ ¯ c/¯ p. These predictions are in line with observed recent economic and
institutional performance in CEE, as highlighted in the introduction.
The argumentabove yields the followingpolicy implicationfor transitioneconomies.
Decentralization of economic activity will increase the size of the market sector, µ,
which in turn will require more enforcement. Citizens’ perception of eﬀectiveness
of enforcement may, however, vary over the sectors.16 If everyone believes that the
market transactions are unpoliced, then everybody in the market sector will ﬁnd
it optimal to breach their contract, further undermining the public perception of
the eﬀectiveness of formal contract enforcement. The larger the enforcement ex-
ternality, the more detrimental could decentralization turn out to be because the
multiplicity of equilibria is more likely for higher δ. The reformers-in-charge should
aim to reduce this externality by means of, for example, publicizing new laws and
improving transparency and accountability of courts.
3.2 Corruptible enforcers
Suppose that at date 5 Nature determines whether the market contract (¯ z, ¯ p)i n
a given buyer-seller pair is ‘enforceable’ (with probability λ) or ‘not enforceable’
(with probability 1 − λ). A contractual breach, when it occurs, is remedied by a
self-interested enforcer who may well prefer not to take any enforcement action in
exchange for a bribe from the seller. To maintain the focus on imperfect enforcement
of contracts in the market, I continue to assume that there is no uncertainty with
respect to enforceability of contracts in the state sector.17 The level of corruption
in the economy is assumed to be exogenous: a contract enforcer is corruptible with
probability 0 <r≤ 1 in which case he will accept a bribe b>0 in exchange for
13concealing the information regarding enforceability of the market contract.
Consider the bribe payment which the seller will be prepared to pay to the
enforcer in exchange for enforcement inaction. If ex post enforceable contract is not
enforced, then the seller’s gain is ¯ p − b. Otherwise, in the absence of a collusive
agreement with the enforcer, the seller expects to obtain ¯ p − d =0 .F o rb r i b e r yt o
occur, therefore, the bribe cannot exceed ¯ p.L e tb = k¯ p with 0 <k<1r e p r e s e n t i n g
the bargaining power of the enforcer.
Before calculating the players’ expected payoﬀs in the modiﬁed game, observe
that an honest seller’s expected gain from the market contract (¯ z, ¯ p), as speciﬁed in
(4), is not aﬀected by considerations of corruption simply because corruption is only
possible once a contract is breached and honest sellers are assumed to comply with
their contracts without fail.18 On signing contract (¯ z, ¯ p) in the environment with




1 − γ(1− q)

· ¯ z −

1 − λγ(1− q)(1− r)





1 − λ(1− q)[1− r(1− k)]

· ¯ p − q¯ c, (7)
where q is chosen by the opportunistic seller in order to maximize (7), as before.
The seller expects to incur the cost of providing the high quality if he complies with
the contract (probability q). He will keep the buyer’s up front payment, ¯ p, unless
he breaches the contract (probability 1− q). In the latter case, the breach is either
remedied by an honest enforcer (with probability λ(1− r)), and the seller loses the
up front payment; or the breach is not remedied because the enforcer is bribed
(with probability λr), the seller then loses k portion of the up front payment. When
enforcers are corruptible, the buyer’s gain, (6), from contract (¯ z, ¯ p) is smaller by
λγ(1−q)·r¯ p, as compared to the no corruption market contract payoﬀ (2), namely
it is smaller by the expected loss of the up front payment in all circumstances except




¯ p[1 − r(1 − k)]
,λ c
2 =




¯ p − ¯ c
¯ p(1− k)
,r 2 =
¯ z − ¯ p − γ(¯ z − ¯ c)
¯ z − ¯ p − γ(¯ z − ¯ c)+k(¯ p − (1 − γ)¯ z)
. (9)
14Proposition 3 Assume (A1), 0 <k<1, and let (8) and (9). Then there exists a
unique equilibrium of the game with corruptible enforcers and it is WE, unless
(i) λ ≥ λc
1 and r ≤ min {r1;1 }, in which case it is SE; or
(ii) λc
2 ≤ λ<λ c
1, γ<(¯ z − ¯ p)/(¯ z − ¯ c),a n dr<r 2, in which case it is IE.
The intuition behind Prop.3 is simple. For buyers to prefer contractingin the market
to theiroutside option, enforceabilityof contract(¯ z, ¯ p) must be suﬃciently high, as in
either 3i or 3ii. In addition, for an opportunistic seller to prefer compliance, and thus
for SE equilibrium to exist cost of breach must be large enough (e.g. the number of
corruptible enforcers is relatively small). As before, in IE equilibrium some contract
enforceability per se is not suﬃcient to deter breach by all opportunistic sellers in
the market; the buyers however prefer market contracting because the expected
value of (¯ z, ¯ p) contract is higher than their outside option. In the environment with
corruptible enforcers, this would be the case when both the proportion of breaching
sellers as well as the level of corruption among the enforcers is small enough. When
neither of these two scenarios is possible, then it is less harmful for the buyers to
opt out of market contracting altogether. Two observations immediately follow from
Prop.3:
Remark 1 SE equilibrium is more diﬃcult to sustain when enforcers are corrupt.
The proof is a straightforward comparison of the cut-oﬀ in the statement of Prop.3i
with its analogue in the no-corruption environment of section 2.2, ¯ c/¯ p. Clearly, the
former exceeds the no-corruption cut-oﬀ for any 0 <k<1a n d0<r≤ 1. The
remark implies that when contract enforcers are corruptible the institution of formal
contract enforcement needs to be more eﬀective (the probability that the contract
is enforceable has to be higher) for opportunistic sellers to choose compliance in
equilibrium.
Remark 2 Assume (A1), r =1 ,a n dλ ≥ λc
1. If additionally k>¯ c/¯ p,t h e nS E
equilibrium prevails despite the high level of corruption in enforcement of market
contracts.
15Intuitively, breach of market contracts will not occur when all enforcers are corrupt,
have suﬃciently strong bargaining power, and are large in number. To check this
result, note that by Prop.3i, in the speciﬁed range of parameters the opportunistic
sellers optimize by setting q = 1, thus making the buyers in the market to prefer
contract (¯ z, ¯ p) over their outside option. The key to understanding this result is the
strong bargaining power enjoyed by the corrupt market contract enforcer when the
existing legal provisions as such aﬀord a high enough probability of enforcement:
since all enforcers are corrupt, a breached contract is certain to attract an enforcer’s
demand for a bribe (due to r = 1), and thus the breaching seller stands to lose a
large part of the gain from his breach (due to k>¯ c/¯ p). It is cheaper for the seller to
comply with his market contract than to get involved in the bribing game. Hence,
corruptibility of enforcers who can extract large bribes serves as a deterrent to
contractual breach. This result highlights the relative importance of strengthening
formal institutions in an economy with a high level of corruption (i.e, increasing
the value of λ above the threshold given by Prop.3i). An improvement in formal
institutions supporting markets is beneﬁcial in curbing opportunistic behaviour of
both private agents (sellers) as well as holders of public oﬃce (enforcers).
4 Importance of institutions in corrupt environments
This section further explores the implications of the result stated in Remark 2 which
suggested the ﬁrst-order importance of institutions in environments with corrupt
public and private agents. The robustness of the result is checked by relaxing some
of the assumptions of the basic model. Speciﬁcally, the extensions in this section
introduce positive litigation costs, independent audits of enforcers, and breaching
behaviour of buyers.
4.1 Costly litigation
Recall that Remark 2 relies on the assumption of costless litigation. It is intuitive
to expect that with positive litigation costs borne by the party bringing the case for
16enforcement, the buyer will be unwilling to take her breaching seller to court, since
on the equilibrium path with the enforcer who is corrupt with certainty (r =1 ) ,
the buyer does not expect enforcement and therefore will be wasting her resources
on litigation.19 This section, however, demonstrates that the validity of Remark
2 can also be established under costly litigation, provided that either (i) the cor-
rupt enforcer is subject to a cost of taking inappropriate enforcement action, or
(ii) enforcement action taken is subject to an independent audit with a positive
probability. Arguably, these assumptions—costly litigation with either an explicit
auditing of enforcers or an implicit (perhaps, reputational) cost associated with non-
enforcement of legitimate contracts—make the simple setting of sections 2.1 and 3.2
more realistic.
Formally, let ξ>0 denote the cost associated with seeking enforcement of a
breached contract and assume that this cost is borne by the buyer unless the en-
forcement action is obtained through litigation. In the latter case the seller is forced
to reimburse the buyer’s litigation cost (in addition to the pay back of the down pay-
ment, ¯ p). For simplicity, let r = 1, so that it is known that all enforcers are corrupt
and for a bribe may choose to take no-enforcement action when a given contract
turns out to be enforceable ex post. Two scenarios are distinguished:20 Scenario I
“Costly litigation with reputational consequences” and Scenario II “Costly litiga-
tion with enforcement auditing”. In Scenario I, suppose that both the seller and the
buyer can oﬀer a bribe to the corrupt enforcer: the buyer’s bribe is denoted by B,
the seller’s bribe is b as before. Let F>0 denote the marginal cost to the corrupt
enforcer of taking an inappropriate enforcement action (i.e. not enforcing an ex post
enforceable contract). F is intended to capture the idea that the corrupt enforcer
marginally dislikes taking inappropriate enforcement actions: if the buyer and the
seller oﬀer the same bribe, the enforcer would rather accept the bribe from the buyer
and hence take the appropriate enforcement action (albeit for a bribe), because then
his corrupt behaviour is harder to detect. Thus, F captures the monetary equiv-
alent of the implicit damage that the enforcer could suﬀer when his enforcement
inaction becomes public knowledge. In Scenario II, F = B = 0 is assumed, while
the appropriateness of the enforcer’s action—i.e. whether it was possible, given the
17realization of λ, to enforce a given contract—can be established by an independent
auditor (e.g. a trading standards agency or a consumer watchdog): with some prob-
ability τ ∈ (0,1) the auditor can verify the realization of λ and order enforcement,
if necessary.
The timing of the game stated in section 2.1 is now amended to include the
litigation-bribery-enforcement subgame at stage 5: 5(a) Upon delivery of z  =˜ z,t h e
buyer chooses whether to litigate. 5(b) If there is litigation, Nature moves to render
the contract ‘enforceable’ (with probability λ) or ‘not enforceable’ (1 − λ). The
status of the contract is observed by all three: the enforcer, the buyer and the seller.
5(c) If the contract is ‘not enforceable’, the game ends. Otherwise, if the contract is
‘enforceable’: in Scenario I, the buyer and the seller simultaneously choose the value
of B and b, respectively; in Scenario II, the seller chooses the value, b.5 ( d )T h e
proﬁt-maximizing corrupt enforcer accepts or rejects the bribe(s). Only one bribe
oﬀer can be accepted and leads the enforcer to choose ‘enforce’ or ‘not enforce’
in line with the corrupt agreement. If no bribe is accepted, ‘enforce’ is played.
5(e) Scenario II only: the independent monitor ﬁnds the evidence of inappropriate
enforcement action and orders enforcement with probability τ.
In what follows, the existence of SE equilibrium in each case is analyzed sep-
arately and the ﬁndings of these analyses are summarized in Remark 3. Consider
ﬁrst Scenario I. The bribe that the seller is willing to pay to the enforcer in an
attempt to get the no-enforcement action is b ≤ ¯ p + ξ, since if he wins the bribery
game, the seller gets to keep ¯ p albeit at a cost of b, while choosing not to bribe the
seller is certain to pay back the down payment made by the buyer, in addition to
the payment of the buyer’s litigation cost. Since the enforcer obtains b − F from
the seller’s bribe, the buyer only needs to set B =¯ p+ξ −F in order to ensure that
the enforcer (weakly) prefers her oﬀer.21 Would the buyer be willing to litigate,
knowing that a bribe of ¯ p +ξ −F would be necessary to get the contract enforced?
If she chooses not to litigate, the buyer is certain to lose the down payment; while
litigating and bribing, the buyer expects to lose (1−λ)(¯ p+ξ)+λB, or substituting
for B, she expects to lose ¯ p + ξ − λF. Consequently, the buyer will litigate and
18bribe as long as λ ≥ ξ/F (provided that ξ<F ). In turn, the seller who expects
to lose the bribery game to the buyer, will prefer not to breach his contract in the
ﬁrst place if (1 − λ)¯ p + λ(−ξ) ≤ ¯ p − ¯ c, or, re-arranging, if λ ≥ ¯ c/(¯ p + ξ). It can,
therefore, be stated that the SE equilibrium will prevail, provided that 0 <ξ<F
and λ ≥ max{ξ/F, ¯ c/(¯ p+ξ)}, despite certain corruptibility of the enforcer (r =1 ) .
Turning to Scenario II, the seller’s choice of the bribe is determined by the
diﬀerence bribery is expected to make to his end-game payoﬀ: if he does not bribe,
the seller expects to end up with −ξ; while bribing the enforcer in the presence of
an independent auditor, the seller expects to get (1−τ)¯ p−τξ−b. The seller would
therefore be willing to set the bribe
b ≤ b∗ ≡ (1 − τ)(¯ p + ξ), (10)
where b∗ also represents the surplus resulting from the corrupt agreement between
the enforcer and the seller. Suppose, as before, that 0 <k<1 is the enforcer’s
fraction of the surplus. Then the enforcer will accept the bribe kb∗ in exchange for
no enforcement action of the ex post enforceable contract for any 0 <k<1.
The buyer will be prepared to seek enforcement of her breached contract, if the
expected loss from doing so, (1−τλ)(¯ p+ξ), is smaller than the lost downpayment,




τ(¯ p + ξ)
[where λτ
1 < 1f o rτ>τ 1 ≡ ξ/(¯ p + ξ)] (11)
Given the bribe to the enforcer determined above by (10) and expecting the
buyer to litigate under (11), the seller compares his compliance payoﬀ, ¯ p − ¯ c,w i t h
his expected payoﬀ from breaching the contract, which is calculated as follows:
V γ
m(¯ z,λ,k,τ,ξ)=( 1 − λ)¯ p + λ

τ(¯ p − (¯ p + ξ) − kb∗)+(1− τ)(¯ p − kb∗)

=¯ p − λ[τ + k(1 − τ)](¯ p + ξ)
That is, in the case of the breach with corruption, the seller expects to hold on to
the down payment, ¯ p, unless the contract turns out to be enforceable (probability
λ); which triggers the payment of the bribe, k(1−τ)(¯ p+ξ), and, should the auditor
19discover inappropriate non-enforcement (probability τ), the compensation payment





[τ + k(1 − τ)](¯ p + ξ)
[where λτ
2 < 1i f τ ≥ τ2 ≡
¯ c
¯ p + ξ
and 0 <k<1]
(12)
Comparison of (11) and (12) suggests that whenever λ ≥ max{λτ
1,λ τ
2} and τ>
max{τ1,τ 2} for any 0 <k<1, the buyer will litigate, while the seller, expecting to
pay the bribe kb∗ with b∗ given by (10), will prefer ‘compliance’ over ‘breach’.
The analysis of each of the two scenarios above therefore suggests the following:
Remark 3 Under costly litigation, the SE equilibrium prevails, provided that either
there is a cost to an inappropriate enforcement action, or because the institutional
quality (availability of independent random enforcement audits and adequacy of legal
provisions) is suﬃciently high to counter the corruptibility of enforcers.
Note that this result holds for any k ∈ (0,1): In Scenario I, k does not enter the
analysis because the competition between the buyer and the seller drives the bribe
oﬀers to the highest possible level. In Scenario II, suﬃciently high institutional
quality ensures that the seller’s gain from the contractual breach is eroded by the
expectation of contract enforcement through a random audit even when the act of
bribery is relatively cheap for the seller (i.e. even if k is very small). A qualiﬁcation
of Remark 3 is that the ‘good’ equilibrium obtains if litigation costs are smaller than
the implicit damage to the enforcer’s image/reputation from enforcement inaction.
4.2 Two-sided contractual breach
The simple model of section 2.1 was set up to consider the possibility of breach by
a single contractual party, the seller. It is, of course, more realistic to allow the
possibility of breach on both sides of the contract. Formally, let θ¯ p with 0 <θ<1
denote the down payment made by the buyer when contract (¯ z, ¯ p) is agreed in
stage 3 of the game in section 2.1. Suppose that all buyers are drawn from the
20same population as sellers: a buyer is, therefore, honest with probability 1 − γ,i n
which case she pays up (1−θ)¯ p upon the delivery of ¯ z; or she is opportunistic with
probability γ in which case she can choose whether or not to pay up the outstanding
amount upon the delivery. The buyer’s type is her private information. The timing
of the game in section 2.1 is now amended as follows: in stage 3 the prepayment
is θ¯ p; in stage 4, the buyer pays upon the delivery of ¯ z the outstanding amount,
(1−θ)¯ p, depending on her type. A breach is deﬁned as the state of contract following
non-delivery of ¯ z by the seller, or non-payment of (1 − θ)¯ p by the buyer following
the delivery of ¯ z. Therefore, the two parties may go into litigation either in stage
4 (seller’s non-delivery) or in stage 5 (buyer’s default). Let ξ>0 be the litigation
cost, as before.
Suppose ﬁrst that the enforcer is uncorrupt. Then, upon accepting the delivery
of ¯ z, the opportunistic buyer weighs the expected cost of default on the outstanding
payment, λ[(1−θ)¯ p+ξ], against the cost of compliance, (1−θ)¯ p. The buyer would
prefer to comply if
λ ≥ λθ
1 ≡
(1 − θ)¯ p
(1 − θ)¯ p + ξ
. (13)
If all buyers are expected to pay up upon the delivery of ¯ z, what are the incentives
of the opportunistic seller to breach his contract? The cost of compliance for the
seller is ¯ c−(1−θ)¯ p, while non-delivery is now expected to cost λ(θ¯ p+ξ). The seller
would therefore be willing to comply and deliver ¯ z if
λ ≥ λθ
2 ≡
¯ c − (1 − θ)¯ p
ξ + θ¯ p
(14)
It is therefore established that, in the absence of corruption in enforcement, the
no-breach equilibrium SE exists if λ ≥ max{λθ
1,λ θ
2} for any ξ>0a n d0<θ<1.
Assume now that the enforcer is corrupt (r = 1), but he marginally dislikes
taking the wrong enforcement action, i.e. consider the Scenario I with F>0o f
section 4.1 above. For the existence of the no-breach equilibrium, it is necessary
to check that opportunistic buyers, as well as opportunistic sellers, ﬁnd it optimal
to comply with their contract (¯ z, ¯ p). Then analogously with the analysis in section
4.1, if a breaching opportunistic seller is prepared to bribe up to θ¯ p + ξ for no-
21enforcement action, then his buyer would be prepared to set her bribe at θ¯ p+ξ −F
in order to get the contract enforced even when the enforcer is corrupt. With
this bribe, the buyer’s expected payoﬀ from litigation becomes −(θ¯ p + ξ)+λF,
which is higher than her no-litigation payoﬀ of −θ¯ p, provided that λ ≥ ξ/F (and
ξ<F ). Then the opportunistic seller, who does not expect to win the bribery
game, will ﬁnd it optimal to comply and get ¯ p − ¯ c, rather than breach and obtain
θ¯ p − λ(θ¯ p + ξ), provided that λ ≥ λθ
2. Would the opportunistic buyer breach her
contract in Scenario I? Defaulting on the outstanding payment upon the delivery
of ¯ z, she would be prepared to set the bribe at B ≤ (1 − θ)¯ p + ξ to avoid the
enforcement. This, in turn, would allow the seller who delivered ¯ z to set his bribe
at b =( 1−θ)¯ p +ξ − F, in order to get the corrupt enforcer to choose enforcement.
It is easy to see that the non-cheating seller will ﬁnd it optimal to bribe the enforcer
to get enforcement of the initial contract (i.e. in order to extract the outstanding
payment from the defaulting buyer) since ¯ p−¯ c ≥ θ¯ p−¯ c−ξ holds for any ξ>0a n d
0 <θ<1. To check that the seller will be willing to litigate when his buyer defaults
on the outstanding payment after the delivery of ¯ z, notice that litigation with the
bribe is expected to pay oﬀ θ¯ p−¯ c−ξ +λ[(1−θ)¯ p+ξ −b], or θ¯ p−¯ c−ξ+λF,w h i c h
is greater than the seller’s no-litigation payoﬀ of θ¯ p − ¯ c when λ ≥ ξ/F and ξ<F .
Given that her default on the outstanding payment is expected to be enforced by a
corrupt enforcer (because the enforcer will have accepted the bribe from the seller),
the buyer will ﬁnd it optimal not to default in the ﬁrst place if λ ≥ λθ
1: in this range
of parameter λ the expected cost of default, λ[(1− θ)¯ p + ξ], is higher than the cost
of compliance, (1 − θ)¯ p. Summarizing this analysis, when the enforcer is corrupt




Remark 4 Allowing for two-sided breach, the no-breach equilibrium SE exists even
when all enforcers are corrupt with certainty, provided that the institutional quality
is suﬃciently high.
This result therefore conﬁrms the robustness of Remark 2 regarding the ﬁrst-order
importance of institutional quality in high-corruption environments. Notice, how-
22ever, that the two-sided breach studied above is essentially one-sided sequential
breach, which, arguably, is the kind of breach that is normally observed in real-life
economic transactions. A simultaneous play, namely the seller’s choice between the
delivery of ¯ z and non-delivery, concurrent with the buyer’s choice between the pay-
ment of (1−θ)¯ p and non-payment, could lead to three possible breach outcomes: (i)
the delivery of ¯ z combined with non-payment of (1−θ)¯ p, (ii) the payment of (1−θ)¯ p
combined with non-delivery, and (iii) non-payment combined with non-delivery. The
ﬁrst two breach outcomes are clearly one-sided. The third breach outcome under
the assumption of reliance damages would be interpreted by the court as either an
annulment of the contract (when θ = 0 which implies zero expected payoﬀ for each
breaching player in the simultaneous game), or as a breach by the seller (when θ>0,
since the breach remedy in this case would force the seller to return the payment of
(1−θ)¯ z made by the buyer). Thus, the simultaneous play would not change neither
the analysis, nor the results, presented here.
5 Comparative statics and policy implications
This section considers how various factors, which have been suggested by the recent
transition literature as contributing to an explanation of the observed variation in
economic performance in CEE (Bergl¨ of and Bolton 2002a, Hoﬀ and Stiglitz 2004,
Roland 2002), would impact on the equilibrium outcomes derived in section 3.1.
The comparative statics exercise focuses on the following parameters: the size of
the enforcement externality, δ, and the characteristics of the market sector contract
¯ z, ¯ p, ¯ c.
Notice ﬁrst that a lower value of parameter δ, other things remaining equal, will
lead to a downward shift in Fig.1b of the threshold value λδ
1, thus enlarging the
parameter space in which SE is unique. The enforcement externality is expected to
be lower in countries where exposure to markets before communism and/or prior
to transition towards capitalism have been signiﬁcant. This is because it can be
conjectured that its opposite, a historically very small (or non-existent) market
23sector prior to reforms, meant that most trades outside the state sector were illegal.
Following economic liberalization, the perception of illegitimacy of market exchange
is likely to linger on,22 which would translate into a larger value of δ,c o m p a r e dt oa
country that had some experience of market exchange prior to transition. Similarly,
a larger value of δ is likely in a country that underwent corrupt privatization because
in its aftermath economic agents learn not to trust (Hoﬀ and Stiglitz 2004). It is
also plausible to conjecture that the level of enforcement externality is likely to be
low in a country with a historically low legacy of corruption (because the degree
of mistrust in the society is then low), greater legitimacy of the state, politicians’
accountability to the electorate, tradition of democracy before WWII, geographical
proximity and likelihood of accession to the European Union, and overall respect
for the rule of law.
Consider next changes in the characteristics of the market contract. A lower
value of ¯ p implies an upward shift in the cut-oﬀ values of ¯ c/¯ p and λδ
1, while λδ
2 is
pushed to the right. As can be seen from Fig. 1b, this implies a shrinkage in the
area where SE is unique and an increased region with multiple equilibria (because
for a one unit change in ¯ p the magnitude of the corresponding change in ¯ c/¯ p is
smaller than that in λδ
1). Arguably, a hyperinﬂation creates the perception of a
relatively low ¯ p today compared to prices tomorrow. In contrast, a lower level of
¯ c, other things remaining the same, shifts ¯ c/¯ p and λδ
1 down, leaving λδ
2 unaﬀected.
That means the area where SE is unique expands, while the region with multiple
equilibria shrinks more than the area where an inferior equilibrium (WE or IE) is
unique. A lower cost of supplying the market good is likely to occur when the agents
in the economy had previous experience of decentralized exchange (e.g. because the
logistics of procuring or producing the market good is already in place). A lower
value of ¯ z has no impact except on the cut-oﬀ λδ
2, which would shift it to the left thus
increasing the area where WE is feasible. The value of the domestically produced
market good may be lower in a natural resource abundant economy that is open
to trade with economies that are relatively more abundant in capital (assuming the
domestic consumers have a greater preference for relatively capital-intensive goods).
Then, for the same level of the exogenously given probability of enforcement the
24incidence of the worst equilibrium, WE, is higher when natural resource abundance
is higher.
An altogether diﬀerent matter that has implications well beyond transition eco-
nomics and that is increasingly attracting scholars’ attention is what shapes the
structure of the new market-friendly institutions and why some governments fail to
invest into the institutional infrastructure (such as law enforcement) despite its pos-
itive implications for economic development and growth. I brieﬂy summarize the
handful of very recent research that suggests some highly plausible and thought-
provoking explanations, and explore one of the proposed arguments which lends
itself naturally to replication in the present setting.
The past decade of transition in CEE highlighted the fact that a mass transfer of
state assets into private ownership in quite a few notable examples (e.g. Russia) was
not suﬃcient for generating sizeable grass-root demand for the rule of law and im-
provements in law enforcement. According to Hoﬀ and Stiglitz (2004), the weakness
of political demand for the rule of law may be accounted for by the prevailing uncer-
tainty regarding the future enforcement regime. This uncertainty creates incentives
for economic agents to behave opportunistically and strip assets under their own-
ership (rather than invest into increasing the value of those assets), which in turn
makes it attractive to prolong the state of lawlessness (due to the ease of stripping
assets under a weak enforcement of law). Factors that make stripping assets easier
(e.g. open capital markets that allow ill-begotten gains to be safely whisked away
into foreign bank accounts) contribute to the reduced constituency for the rule of
law and ultimately to prolonging the no-rule-of-law state. Another explanation of
weak support for the rule of law is suggested in Bergl¨ of and Bolton (2002b) and
derives from the extent of income inequality. Income inequality predicates diﬀerent
individual incentives with respect to the rule of law and income redistribution. The
rich and the middle class (unlike the poor) are not interested in redistribution, but
are able to make productive investments (also unlike the poor). Support for the rule
of law in this model comes from the poor (interested in redistribution) and, possibly,
the middle class who turn out to contain the pivotal voter. The middle class voters
25will support the rule of law only if they have an incentive to make the investment:
the return on the investment must be suﬃciently large, while the deadweight loss of
taxation suﬃciently small. Thus, a large enough middle class that is willing to invest
can be an eﬀective constituency for the rule of law, because the investment today
inﬂuences these individuals’ incentive to support the rule of law tomorrow, whereas
the expectation of no rule of law tomorrow diminishes their incentive to invest to-
day. Inequality in wealth and power is also key to weak political demand for the
rule of law in Sonin (2003). Here the powerful and wealthy agents have incentives
to shape the institutions of enforcement in their favour by choosing a low level of
public protection of property rights (and investing instead into private protection)
because this strategy allows them to reap greater ﬁnancial gain from corporate and
social assets. Finally, the analysis by Roland and Verdier (2003) suggests that a ‘big
bang’ reform strategy itself may be called to account for an insuﬃcient investment
into law enforcement institutions in transition. The big bang strategy in privatiza-
tion is an overnight transfer of all state assets into private ownership. Its opposite,
the gradualist strategy, which leaves a part of the economy in the state sector in
the initial years of reforms, Roland and Verdier (2003) argue, eliminates multiple
equilibria resulting in an outcome with better institutional support for markets.
This is because in the presence of enforcement and tax externalities, the individual
incentives for good behaviour that lead to investment and support for the rule of law
are enhanced if maintaining direct state control over a part of the economy allows
the government to ﬁnance law enforcement at a minimal level of taxation of private
capital.
The Roland and Verdier (2003) argument ﬁnds a natural replication in the
present setting. Let t ∈ [0,1] denote the rate of tax levied on the market sup-
plier and incorporate taxation externality in the analysis of section 3.1 by allowing
λ = λ[(1−µ)+µ{−δ(1−q)+tq +δt(1−q)}]. This formulation of the enforcement
externality now captures the idea that some resources which are channelled from
the state sector are available for enforcement of market contracts and contribute to
1 − µ of λ, the exogenous probability of enforcement. The inﬂuence of the market
sector on the probability of contract enforcement, λ, is negative due to enforcement
26externality imposed by breaching market suppliers, −δ(1−q), as before, but positive
due to the resources available from taxing law-abiding market suppliers, tq.T h el a s t
term in the square bracket signiﬁes the positive eﬀect of taxation on the enforcement
externality: greater resources obtained through taxation reduce somewhat the neg-
ative eﬀect of mass non-compliance. With this formulation, it is straightforward to
check that multiple equilibria (e.g. SE and IE) exist when t>˜ t =[ µ(1+δ)−1]/(µδ).
Alternatively, if t ≤ ˜ t, then SE is unique. Thus it is shown that gradualism (de-
ﬁned here as a positive size of the state sector, which allows to generate ﬁnance
for enforcement of market contracts) allows to eliminate the inferior equilibrium, a
prediction which is in line with Roland and Verdier (2003).
6 Concluding comments
The results of this paper highlight the importance of institutions for the transition
‘from plan to market’: absent or inadequate institutions lead to a loss of beneﬁcial
decentralized contracts. Moreover, when formal contract enforcement exhibits a neg-
ative externality, then even for a relatively large amount of ﬁxed resources devoted
to enforcement bad equilibrium may prevail, because the equilibrium is determined
by traders’ perception of the eﬀectiveness of enforcement. The larger the externality,
the harder it is to achieve the good equilibrium in which all traders comply with
their contractual obligations. The eﬀect of a large externality on the welfare of the
economy is indirect and feeds through the overall trading surplus. The larger the
size of the market, the higher the proportion of beneﬁcial trades which are lost in
the weak enforcement equilibrium. This conclusion is likely to become even more
grim if we accept that a large-scale change in the organization of economic activity
(e.g. a change ‘from plan to market’) is likely to require new laws which are better
suited to the new economic order.23 The analysis also suggests that institutions
to support market interaction have a ﬁrst order eﬀect on the success of liberaliza-
tion in an environment of endemic corruption because an adequate legal framework
helps to curb the high level of corruption in enforcement, as well as opportunism in
contracting, by exposing the breacher to the enforcer’s extortionary demands.
27The signiﬁcance of perceptions of institutional quality suggested by the analysis
above merits further investigation, both theoretically and empirically. It is intuitive
to expect that once institutional improvements are introduced a (perhaps, grad-
ual) change in perceptions is likely. A theory of how perceptions are formed would
therefore be useful for a better understanding of market interaction, as well as better
policy design for a smooth transition.24 The analysis also suggests a novel perspec-
tive for evaluating empirically the impact of perceptions of legal infrastructure on
economic performance in CEE.25 Cross-country variation in output fall and corrup-
tion can be explained by diﬀerences in perceived legal eﬀectiveness, which is either
measured directly (EBRD 1999), or approximated by the measures of enforcement
externality such as legal legacy and previous exposure to private contracting and
democracy.
Extending the theoretical analysis to repeated interaction could also help evalu-
ate the relative signiﬁcance of formal enforcement mechanisms versus informal ones.
Survey-based evidence for CEE economies (McMillan and Woodruﬀ (1999b, 1999a,
2000); Johnson, McMillan, and Woodruﬀ (2002)) indicates that inadequacy of the
legal infrastructure of laws, courts and police inherited from the years of directives
and planning forces businesses to rely on reputation (e.g. gossip, social and/or
business networks). Informal enforcement supported by information sharing cannot
however substitute for formal enforcement entirely: while reputation helps to sustain
established trading partnerships, eﬀective courts encourage formation of new rela-
tionships by lowering switching costs and reducing risks.26 These empirical ﬁndings
therefore call for a detailed theoretical analysis of the relative merits of a particular
enforcement mechanism in diﬀerent types of economic environment.
28Notes
1I would like to thank Spiros Bougheas, Panicos Demetriades, Jim Malcomson,
Nicolas Melissas, MartinSefton, Tom Weyman-Jones, Tim Worrall, and participants
of the Royal Economic Society annual conference in Warwick, the Econometric So-
ciety European Meeting in Venice, the Midlands Game Theory and Applications
Workshop in Nottingham for constructive discussions. The usual disclaimer applies.
2See Blanchard (1997) for a ﬂavour of the issues in the early transition litera-
ture. A comprehensive summary of theoretical and applied research in transition
economics is in Roland (2000), a recent survey of the literature which stresses the
importance of institutions in transition is Roland (2002).
3An inadequacy (or lack) of new market-friendly institutions is thus another rea-
son for the output fall observed in the initial years of post-communist transition.
This explanation, based on informational and legal factors, complements those ex-
isting in the literature which emphasize strong technological complementarities as
resulting from ineﬃcient bargaining (Blanchard and Kremer 1997) or capital de-
preciation and delays due to search for more eﬃcient partners (Roland and Verdier
1999).
4Ironically, one study found that ‘statutory legal protections in Russia, which
were much lower than the world average in 1992, were some of the world’s highest
by 1998’ (World Bank 2002, p. 64).
5Political centralization to aid smooth economic decentralization, as suggested
in Blanchard and Shleifer (2001), is then a natural channel, in view of the model
presented here, for achieving better perception of legal eﬀectiveness, since the cen-
tral government is a provider of the basic institutional environment. Other channels
to improve perceptions of institutional quality, actively promoted in World Bank
(2002), include better transparency and accountability of courts, improved dissem-
ination of information about recently enacted laws, training of law enforcers, and
anti-corruption measures.
296This is the ‘grabbing-hand’ paradigm of the state involvement in the economy
(Frye and Shleifer 1997).
7The present paper’s modelling of corruption as bribery is standard in the liter-
ature: see for instance, Shleifer and Vishny (1993), Bardhan (1997), and Johnson,
Kaufmann, McMillan, and Woodruﬀ (2000). Acemoglu and Verdier (1998) analyze
simultaneous determination of corruption, property rights enforcement, and invest-
ment in a model which leaves out considerations of economic decentralization.
8This analysis is also of relevance to the debate about public versus private
ownership. The ‘economy’ in the model could be interpreted as a sector of the
economy (e.g. health or education), with a part of the sector operating in the
‘planned’ (or directed) regime and the other part operating in a free market regime.
The model proposed here could therefore be useful for understanding the role of law
enforcement or regulation in combating fraud and opportunism in the provision of
health care, education, and pensions.
9Section 4.2 below relaxes this assumption by allowing a partial pre-payment.
10In section 4.2 some buyers may behave opportunistically.
11λ<1 can also represent the extent to which judiciary is unpredictable in re-
solving private disputes, or the information necessary for remedying the breach is
partly veriﬁable.
12Positive litigation costs are introduced in section 4.1.
13It can be checked that the alternative assumption—unsuccessful buyers do not
have the opportunity to contract in the other sector—would strengthen the quali-
tative results presented below.
14It can be shown that the same equilibrium allocation of buyers across the two
sectors would result even if the market contract price were to adjust in response to
an excess demand (Andrianova 2004).
15Note that this analysis suggests that a normalization of the standard quality,
z, to 0, with the consequent re-interpretation of market as ‘contracting’ sector and
30state as ‘non-contracting’ sector, would imply that the contracting sector emerges
when the institutional quality is suﬃciently high (namely, λ ≥ ¯ c/¯ p). A similar result
is found in Kali (1999) who examines the impact of business networks, providing
informal contract enforcement, on the functioning of anonymous market exchange
in a model with repeated matching and an unreliable legal system (in a sense that
an innocent party may be convicted on a false accusation). Kali ﬁnds that such
networks are not enforceable when court reliability is high, but become enforceable
otherwise when they may emerge as a substitute for market exchange.
16Scholars of legal transition argue that a perception of inadequacy may arise if
new laws to support markets are legal transplants from the West and run counter
to local informal norms (Pistor 1996, Rubin 1997).
17Corruption of enforcers in the state sector is also possible and several scenarios
can be envisaged to give rise to a negative spillover eﬀect on the enforcement of
market contracts. The results presented in this section will then be even stronger.
18Allowing for framing or blackmail by enforcers may well reverse this conclusion.
See Polinsky and Shavell (2001) for an analysis of framing in law enforcement.
19Note, however, that recent experimental evidence (for a survey, see Fehr and
Schmidt (2003)) suggests that economic agents are often strongly motivated by
fairness and reciprocity and are therefore willingto reward or punish their opponents
even at a considerable cost to themselves. It is therefore not implausible that,
motivated by revenge, the victim of breach in the enforcement subgame of section
2.2 will litigate even when litigation is costly and the enforcer is corrupt. This is
because litigation, albeit at a cost to the victim, allows the victim to punish the
breacher who is then forced to surrender part of his gain from the breach in order to
pay a bribe to the corrupt enforcer. For a ﬂavour of the analysis and experimental
evidence of payoﬀ-reducing behaviour motivated by revenge see Abbink, Irlenbusch,
and Renner (2000) and Falk, Fehr, and Fischbacher (2000).
20It is straightforward to simultaneously incorporate both scenarios into the same
model, the separation here serves expositional clarity.
3121This is the familiarBertrand outcome of a game between two ﬁrms that produce
a homogenous good but have diﬀerent marginal costs; see Blume (2003) for the
recent rigorous proof of the standard Bertrand result.
22An attitudes survey by Shiller, Boycko, and Korobov (1991) at the start of eco-
nomic reforms in Russia found that, compared to their United States counterparts,
a signiﬁcantly higher proportion of the respondents from the Soviet Union expected
businessmen to be dishonest.
23E.g. the chairman of the Higher Commercial Court of the Russian Federation
complained that ‘we are being asked to solve complex equations in multiple un-
knowns without so much as a multiplication table to guide us’ (Izvestiia,J u l y3
1993, cit op Gustafson (1999, p. 151)).
24Such a theory calls for a repeated game framework and may encompass the
Tirole (1996) mechanism of collective reputations.
25It can be noted, however, that the present theoretical analysis is in agreement
with case-study evidence of transition in CEE: see, for example, Gray and Hendley
(1997), and Greif and Kandel (1995).
26The results presented in section 3.1 also suggest that reliance on a reputational
mechanism such as trust to support cooperation when formal enforcement mecha-
nisms are ineﬀective may be problematic: if economic agents believe there is a high
probability of opportunism, then lack of formal institutions combined with lack of
trust will force the economy into a bad equilibrium.
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